Kordofan battles: The spark of conflict knocks on El-Obeid’s door

In a significant shift in Sudan’s protracted war, ongoing since mid-April 2023, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) announced on August 3, 2025, their control over several areas in the Kordofan region.

In an official statement, the RSF declared that its forces had "advanced from all directions towards El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan State, successfully liberating multiple areas through intense battles."

Kordofan holds strategic significance, acting as a vital link between Sudan’s central, western, and southern regions, rendering it a decisive arena in the conflict. The RSF has thus far achieved substantial gains in the region.

This latest development follows a defeat inflicted upon the militias and Islamist battalions allied with the Sudanese army in Um Sayala, North Kordofan, on July 30.

In its statement, the RSF said: “As the dawn of a peace government emerges under the Founding Coalition, the victories of the RSF have continued across multiple fronts. Today, Wednesday, our brave forces secured a second victory against the terrorist Islamic Movement’s army in Um Sayala, east of Jabra in North Kordofan State.”

The statement added: “Our courageous fighters engaged in a decisive battle, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy exceeding 100 dead. They seized combat vehicles fully equipped with armaments, along with weapons and ammunition. The remnants of the opposing forces fled the battlefield.”

The RSF’s sweeping victories across various regions of Sudan have compelled the national army to resort to mobilizing militias, raising fears of escalating ethnic and tribal dimensions within the conflict.

In a recent development, on August 2, 2025, a new militia named "Kordofan Shield" was announced to support the Sudanese army in countering the RSF’s advances in Kordofan.

A coalition of Kordofan tribes stated that the formation of this new militia was “modeled after the Sudan Shield Forces,” explaining that “Kordofan Shield is now operating in coordination with the Armed Forces along multiple axes, particularly the Jabra-Bara export route.”

The establishment of yet another militia has sparked widespread concern among civilians, given the rising incidents of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and indiscriminate shelling of residential areas by militias allied with the Sudanese army.

Reports from Sudanese sources highlight an alarming increase in security breakdowns and unlawful killings, the latest being the murder of a young man in Al-Hattana, Omdurman, in broad daylight.

Commenting on the deteriorating situation, citizen Mohamed Hussein stated that people in Omdurman "no longer feel safe even within their homes, as crimes are committed in front of residences, targeting women and children, with jewelry being snatched at gunpoint."

Another resident, who requested anonymity, told Sudan’s Al-Taghyeer newspaper that “the neighborhoods of Burri Al-Lamab and Al-Riyadh witnessed the killing of two individuals at the hands of men wearing the uniforms of the joint forces of the armed struggle movements, targeting them during the night.”

He added: “Members of the joint force, visibly intoxicated, stopped a young man from Burri Al-Lamab and demanded he hand over his mobile phone, a ‘Rabika.’ When he refused, they shot him dead. These areas, located east of Khartoum, are subjected to ongoing security violations by regular and joint forces, making it dangerous for citizens to venture out at night.”

Meanwhile, the Karari Resistance Committee earlier sounded the alarm over the “dire security situation in Omdurman,” citing rampant looting perpetrated by army units. The committee stated that Omdurman “is enduring an organized looting campaign led by certain soldiers, tax investigation units, and local authorities amidst a vacuum of law and accountability.”

Previously, the RSF had warned of “the grave threat posed by extremist and rogue militias to Sudan’s future, as well as to regional and international security,” highlighting their increasing use of civilian infrastructure and state institutions to sustain a war they are unwilling to resolve peacefully.

According to Sudanese lawyer Ali Abdullah, the militias recruited by the Sudanese army “under the pretext of fighting the RSF are illegal.” He asserted that “these militias were formed by political parties and factions under the guise of combating the RSF, but their ultimate aim is to seize power.”

He emphasized, “Fighting the RSF is the army’s responsibility; all these groups are militias, regardless of what names they adopt.” He warned, “The Sudanese people are being forced to drink from the same bitter cup they have tasted before and continue to taste today. There will be no political or social stability in the country.”

Abdullah further noted that these militias are now engaged in classifying citizens and distributing “certificates of patriotism,” committing various abuses and inciting narratives that label certain areas as “rebel strongholds,” thereby threatening to fracture Sudanese society along divisive lines.

“These entities have no legal basis for their establishment under any Sudanese constitution, including the 2005 and 2019 charters. They are tailoring the law to serve their own interests,” he added.

Researcher Babiker Al-Haj believes that “armed militias inherently oppose democratic civil transitions and support military coups. Their positions stem from the very structure of these militias, the nature of their leadership, and the intertwining of their public and private interests.”

Among the militias aligned with the Sudanese army are the extremist Al-Bara Ibn Malik Battalions, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. This group was reportedly responsible for “igniting the initial spark of the war” to thwart any political settlement that might revive the democratic transition process.

The battalion has successfully entrenched itself within the Sudanese army and actively participates in the current conflict, exploiting its “official cover to recruit Sudanese youth,” according to a naval officer in Port Sudan.

He noted that while the battalion promotes its involvement in the fighting under the slogan of “defending the homeland,” its training sessions are steeped in “strictly jihadist religious lessons, revealing a deeper agenda than what is publicly disclosed.”

He added that the battalion relies on “extremist religious rhetoric, indoctrinating recruits with jihadist ideologies,” capitalizing on the security, intellectual, and political void left by the war, as well as the resurgence of Islamists in the political arena, enabling its expansion with little to no resistance.

Political and military analyst Ahmed Abdel Hadi remarked that “the danger lies not merely in the emergence of jihadist groups, but in the state institutions embracing them as allies. This scenario mirrors catastrophic precedents where proxy militant groups eventually spiraled out of control and turned against the state itself.”

He pointed out that “members of the Al-Bara Battalion are qualitatively different from their counterparts in other jihadist organizations, posing a unique and complex threat.”