OPINION: Kenya can use middle power coalitions as a pragmatic diplomatic alternative
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Can Kenya join MIKTA? That was the lingering question among participants of the Annual 2026 International Relations Society of Kenya (IRSK) conference convened on the 12-13 November 2026 in Nairobi.
Held in collaboration with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) among other partners such as the Australian High Commission in Kenya, the meeting sought to explore how African institutions can transcend the uncertainties of a fragmenting global order.
It is with this in mind that participants were introduced to MIKTA, which is the abbreviated description of an informal cross-regional partnership comprising of middle powers, namely: Mexico; Indonesia; (South) Korea; Türkiye; and Australia.
MIKTA serves as a consultative and coordinative platform within the global multilateral system.
Though it does not have an organizational secretariat, headquarters, or founding treaty, it seeks to strengthen global governance through consensus building on various complex international issues or emerging global challenges.
Under the hypothesis that Kenya is aspiring to be a “World Bridge” in global diplomacy, then participation in MIKTA -thereby adding an additional ‘K’ to become MIKKTA- would be an interesting prospect for its foreign policy.
This is because MIKTA aims to bring both developed and emerging economies with different cultures and from different regions to serve as a connection between the Global North and Global South.
This helps respective countries figure out the rivalries or dynamism of what is no longer simply thought of as a multipolar world, but a multiplex one – a system actively moving past Western hegemonic dominance.
For Kenya, engaging multiplexity as global evolution through MIKTA, as opposed to the unease of great power redistribution under world multipolarity, offers a pathway for diplomatic alternatives for peace through utilizing middle power coalitions.
In a world of heightened volatility, increased competition, and rising nationalism, it is becoming very difficult to build consensus towards resolving concerns within international affairs.
Consequently, considering its own domestic challenges, Kenya can use forums such as MIKTA to not only balance its geopolitical interests but also benchmark its democratic credentials and evaluate its global agency on critical issues of interest.
In pursuing opportunities, such as taking part in MIKTA, Kenya can explore multi-actor engagements at home and abroad as new spaces of diplomatic practice that build bridges between official and unofficial entities on matters arising in the world.
Secondly, Kenya can begin to imagine its diplomatic emergence in based on its desire to become a significant technological theatre as the primary hosting anchor for Africa. This gives Kenya a stronger justification for its geolocational placement in the emerging digital economy.
Thirdly, even as it pursues international collaboration, the country may learn new ways of navigating its international and domestic contestations as a growing democracy.
In joining MIKTA, Kenya has an opportunity to bridge the gulf in ideas between the public and officialdom. It also has the chance to evaluate its own diplomatic return on investment for its actions as an emerging African democracy in a context full of tensions, transitions or reversals.
This is because it gives a chance for open exploration of the country’s aspirations (the ideas government promotes), ambitions (the application of power to project Kenyan strength), or actualization (the resources deployed to protect Kenyan interests).
Lastly, MIKTA offers a space for utilizing middle power coalitions not only as an alternative, but as an innovation to explore its interest on issues such as reform of the United Nations Security Council.
Closer home, MIKTA would offer a crucial space that offers a diverse sounding board on issues dear to Kenya with friendly countries, in so far as reform of the global financial architecture is concerned.
For instance, this all came together when while speaking at the conference Principal Secretary Dr. Korir Sing’Oei indicated, that in engaging institutions such as IRSK, Kenya under its foreign policy inadvertently finds itself championing Nairobi as a diplomatic ecosystem for knowledge production.
This is evident in the fact that the annual IRSK conference has gone full circle in discussing illicit financial flows, from a point of fiscal justice in 2024 to exploring how to enhance asset recovery as an anti-corruption measure across the continent in 2026.
Hence, the conference became an interesting space in which Dr. Sing’Oei chose to update both local, regional, continental, and international participants that Kenya had addressed 19 of 21 the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations that had got Kenya grey listed.
By making such a presentation to dignitaries present from the MIKTA countries at the IRSK conference, it shows how this informal grouping could provide access for Kenyan interests in prioritizing economic transformation, climate action, regional peace, and reforming global financial institutions.
The author is Regional Coordinator for the East African Tax and Governance Network (EATGN). Follow on X @lennwanyama.

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